Godel's Proof and The Human Condition - The Basic Essays

Questions and answers

QUESTION What are you trying to say that has not been said more directly and perhaps more clearly by a number of others? -without all that obfuscation?

ANSWER What I am saying, and it has NOT been said before (by virtue of our 'obfuscatory knowledge'), is that virtually all human endeavor -'the nature and course of human activity and what activity should or should not be taken in (ultimately) some economic, political or other considered direction', has never been systematically dissected. Observing the 'difficulty' typically attending such process, integrity of which turns upon the validity of language and analytical method, what 'the basic essays' do is undertake identifying 'the etiology of the human condition' and, inherently, the etiology of that 'ambiguous and inconsistent language and method'.

What this entails consequently, is a fundamentalistic construction of 'the human condition' -bottom-up human evolution for all its consequences and implications, qualified solely by whatever 'most integral scientific knowledge available', but stuck, unfortunately, with everywhere trying to minimize use of that ambiguous and inconsistent language as the only one available.

What does Godel's Proof have to do with the human condition?

Godel's Proof has nothing to do with 'the human condition' -except, and that in an intellectual sense, it DOES account for its existence by fact of 'ambiguous variables and inconsistent rules of their manipulation':

Godel's Proof is a meta-mathematical development applicable to systems of 'a certain set of properties' (the sytem of whole-number arithmetic in particular as the initial 'primitive' system of such inquiry). In effect, by identifying 'a domain of operational integrity' and thereby (for such systems) 'statements provable or disprovable -or neither of those- within the system', Godel's Proof also identifies statements outside that domain -in the 'human terms' of these essays, statements discussible without respect to the integrity of that domain:

If 'the system of human experience' satisfies that meta-mathematics, then any incorporation of open-domain 'variables' in/as proper elements, axioms or rules of manipulation only corrupts the operational integrity of that system. -The essay, Godel's Proof and The Human Condition, conjectures such a 'The System of Human Experience' (another essay) and identifies:
  • the elements, axioms and rules of manipulation as the closed (but evolvable and evolving) domain of phenomenals in that system
  • 'the class of statements-makeable that can be neither proved nor disproved within the system' as the open domain of noumenals, and
  • the communion of the two as (manifesting) 'the human condition'.

Theorization in general, philosophical, religious, scientific et cetera, is inescapably a matter of belief (axiom, dogma whatever); how do these monographs get around this problem? -if it is a problem at all?

The monographs do not 'get around this problem'. What they do is demonstrate the construction of a framework of humanly-known phenomenology, (there is no other -and in that framework) the etiology of 'the human condition' and 'the nature of our continuing (or other) evolution'. In effect then, what the monographs do is identify this 'ultimate problem of belief' as one being continuingly superceded under our 'intrinsically aristocratizing evolution', that is, as the continuing supercession of noumenalism by (growing) phenomenology.

Is belief a problem? -most certainly, because what is 'unreliably known' can be only unreliably operational (ergo 'the human condition'). The greater fact regarding this problem is that it is intrinsic our physical and civilizational evolution (discounting inevitable 'noise in the system') that 'the stronger the intellectual basis (i.e. phenomenology) of belief -a minimality of axiom, the more supercessional that evolution'.

In this respect then, religious, political and all philosophy in general continues (growingly) to embrace 'scientific method and consequence' while holding (more or less unchallengeably) to whatever noumenalistic views 'substance/material' of which lies beyond the limits of science. Scientists on the other hand ('soft' in particular, but meta-mathematicians on 'the nature of consciousness' as an extreme example), are more or less 'mucking-around' with what may not at all be valid discussion material -a matter of 'the etiology of such discussion' by virtue, effectively, of human evolution and the evolution of language itself. (-Scientists are themselves 'only human' after all, and still evolving.)

You talk about the human condition, but you never say what YOU think it is?

Dictionary or encyclopedia, what one typically finds is 'reference' to the human condition at best -only use of the expression or most indirect description rather than definition. First, we have to understand that 'the human condition' is a function of unanticipitable or 'to only some degree anticipatable' circumstance and eventuality the origins of which lie in basic human drives and pecking order -and ignorance thereof. It refers then, to the complex of mental and/or physical 'problematic situations' that arise, in the course of time, from the interaction of individuals or peoples 'perceiving improprieties in or irresponse regarding their necesssities or wants' -where, however, that is typically defined from out of the societal circumstances (evolutionary) peculiar to those principals -'problematic situations' for which then, resolution of some kind is 'desired or necessary' and perhaps even actively pursued by principals, but 'difficult': 'unrequited love', for example, and poverty -and on into the rarified air of 'natural rights and freedoms'.

the human condition: a phrase generally referring to the problems inherent of circumstance or eventuality in various interpersonal or inter-association memberships (individual, neighborhood, class, people et cetera). Because of the absence of an unambiguous framework of problem encompass and resolution acceptable to all its various principals, furthermore, problems of 'the human condition' tend to be 'only locally and immediately resolvable and/or only partially so at best'.
[What the essays do in this respect ('framework' identified in the discussion of 'belief' above) is develop the 'etiology of the human condition' -but more importantly, they also develop 'the nature of hominid evolution' as inherently and continuingly superceding both concern for 'the human condition' and the condition itself.]
You disdain theorization that is not 'properly founded in phenomenology', yet the essay, Kernel Properties of The Hominid Organism, appears to be your own such theorization. How do you explain this?

Kernel Properties of The Hominid Organism is in fact solidly based upon phenomenology, but like any theorization in the soft sciences, the material here being physiological, 'psychological and sociological', there is no choice but to develop it out of whatever relevant, existing language. The material is, of course, the 'variables' of the human condition, and the problem with those variables as commonly discussed -'right' and 'wrong', 'selfishness', whatever- is their absence of phenomenological base. What the 'kernels' do then, is provide that base by developing 'a more properly applicable set of variables' out of the evolution of warm-blooded vertebrates -prohominid in particular, into those hominid in general. The essay is, necessarily, seminal in this respect.

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Last modified: March 20, 2009